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et al.: Facially Neutral Tax Deductions for Educational Expenses and the

COMMENT
FACIALLY NEUTRAL TAX DEDUCTIONS FOR
EDUCATIONAL EXPENSES AND THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
[Mueller v. A//en, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983)].
I.
The realm of religion .

.

INTRODUCTION

. is where knowledge leaves off, and where

faith begins, and it has never needed the arm of the State for support,
and wherever it has received it, it has harmed both the public and the
religion that it would pretend to serve.'
Notwithstanding Clarence Darrow's warning, in recent years a number
of state legislatures have attempted to provide some form of financial
assistance to parochial elementary and secondary schools. 2 Most of the
devices by which states have attempted to provide such assistance have
been held by the United States Supreme Court to violate the establishment clause of the first amendment. 3 As the Court has charted the constitutional limits of such aid, states have responded to the decisions by
1. Tr. of Oral Arg. 7, Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927), quoted bn
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 264 (1977) (punctuation corrected).
2. See thi#a note 3 and accompanying text (citing Supreme Court decisions upholding or striking down various aid programs). A summary of the various types of aid to
nonpublic schools provided by states as of February 1, 1972 is set out in Committee for
Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 815 n.2, 818 n.6 (1973) (White,
J., dissenting). As of that date, 16 states provided direct aid to parochial schools and 33
provided "auxiliary services or benefits." See id at 816 n.2.
Bills to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to provide a federal tuition tax
credit are currently being considered by the United States Senate and House of Representatives. Both bills would provide a limited tax credit for tuition paid by a taxpayer for
the elementary or secondary education of a dependent, and would disallow such a credit
for tuition paid to schools found to maintain racially discriminatory policies. See S. 528,
98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. 1335-40 (1983); H.R. 1730, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983).
3. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (loans of "instructional materials and
equipment" and provision of field trip transportation and services to nonpublic schools
held unconstitutional); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (loans of "instructional
materials and equipment" and provision of "auxiliary services" to nonpublic schools held
unconstitutional); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973) (tuition reimbursement plan held
unconstitutional); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973) ("maintenance and repair" grants to nonpublic schools, tuition grants for low income families, and tuition tax credits held unconstitutional); Levitt v. Committee for Pub.
Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973) (reimbursement of funds for testing and
record keeping held unconstitutional where no means available to assure that tests were
free of religious instruction); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (state supplement
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enacting new programs in an attempt to find a consititutionally permissible way to ease the financial burdens on private schools. 4 State legislatures are not assisted by the Court's notably inconsistent decisions in this
sensitive area. 5
Some of the most recent cases involve attempts by states to provide
some form of tax relief for the parents of children attending parochial
schools.6 The Supreme Court twice has considered the constitutionality
to salaries of teachers of secular subjects in private schools and "purchase" by state of
"secular educational services" from nonpublic schools held unconstitutional).
The Court has upheld aid programs in five of the 11 major decisions regarding state
aid to parochial schools. See Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983) (tax deduction for
educational expenses upheld); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan,
444 U.S. 646 (1980) (reimbursement of funds for testing and record keeping upheld where
adequate safeguards available to assure that tests were free of religious instruction); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (provision of diagnostic, therapeutic, and remedial
services to parochial school children upheld); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968)
(loan of secular textbooks to parochial schools upheld); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1 (1947) (provision of bus transportation of children to and from parochial schools
upheld).
The first amendment provides in relevant part that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ....
"
U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment applies to the states through the fourteenth
amendment. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108 (1943).
4. In 1971, Catholic elementary schools were closing at the rate of 50 per month. F.
SORAUF, THE WALL OF SEPARATION 14 (1976). Several reasons have been advanced to
explain the crisis in parochial schools. One major reason has been the decreasing number
of priests, nuns, and brothers to staff the schools. In 1970, a majority of the teachers in
Catholic elementary schools were lay people; ten years earlier, one third were lay people.
Id. at 15. Catholic schools in the older cities have been faced with the problem of deteriorating physical plants and the migration of families to the suburbs. Id. Finally, the general decline in support for organized religion has resulted in a decline in charitable giving
to religious schools. Id.
5. Compare Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (loans of secular textbooks
to parochial schools upheld) with Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) and Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (striking down loans of "instructional materials and equipment," such as projectors and maps, to parochial schools); compare Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (provision of bus transportation of children to and from parochial schools upheld) with Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (provision of bus transportation for parochial school field trips held unconstitutional).
6. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983); Franchise Tax Bd. v. United
Am. for Pub. Schools, 419 U.S. 890 (1974) (memorandum decision affirming unreported
decision by California district court holding state income tax reductions for parents of
children in nonpublic schools unconstitutional); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (tuition grants to low-income families and tuition
tax credits held unconstitutional); Rhode Island Fed'n of Teachers v. Norberg, 630 F.2d
855 (1st Cir. 1980) (state income tax deduction almost identical to that upheld in Mueller
held unconstitutional); Public Funds for Pub. Schools v. Byrne, 590 F.2d 514 (3d Cir.
1979), aJ'dmm., 442 U.S. 907 (1979) (tax exemptions for dependents attending nonpublic
schools held unconstitutional); Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. Roemer, 452 F. Supp.
1316 (D. Minn. 1978) (statute upheld in Mueller held unconstitutional in separate action);
Kosydar v. Wolman, 353 F. Supp. 744 (S.D. Ohio 1972),afdsub nom. Grit v. Wolman, 413
U.S. 901 (1973) (tuition tax credits for parents of children in nonpublic schools held un-
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of such tax relief. In 1973, the Court held that tuition tax credits for
parents of children attending nonpublic schools violated the establishment clause. 7 In so holding, the Court expressly reserved the issue of the
constitutionality of "true" tax deductions. 8 The Eighth and First Circuits, confronting nearly identical tax deduction statutes, 9 reached conconstitutional); Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. State, 302 Minn. 216, 224 N.W.2d 344
(1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 988 (1975) (tuition tax credits for parents of children in nonpublic schools held unconstitutional).
7. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
8. Id at 790 n.49. The distinction between a tax deduction and a tax credit is that a
deduction is a subtraction from gross income, before computation of actual tax liability,
while a credit is a reduction of the tax itself, after computation of tax liability. The dollar
value of a deduction thus depends on the particular taxpayer's applicable tax rate after
deductions are subtracted from gross income (so that the value is greater for higher-bracket than for lower-bracket taxpayers, and worthless to taxpayers who do not itemize their
deductions), while a credit has a dollar value which is the same for all taxpayers entitled to
use it. See mnfra notes 80-85 and accompanying text. See generally J. RABKIN & M. JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME, GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION § 1.01(2), (3) (1982).
9. MINN. STAT. § 290.09(22) (1982). The Minnesota statute provides for the following deduction from gross income in computing net income:
Tuition and transportation expense. The amount he has paid to others, not to
exceed $500 for each dependent in grades K to 6 and $700 for each dependent in
grades 7 to 12, for tuition, textbooks and transportation for each dependent in
attending an elementary or secondary school situated in Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Iowa, or Wisconsin, wherein a resident of this state may
legally fulfill the state's compulsory attendance laws, which is not operated for
profit, and which adheres to the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
chapter 363. As used in this subdivision, 'textbooks' shall mean and include
books and other instructional materials and equipment used in elementary and
secondary schools in teaching only those subjects legally and commonly taught
in public elementary and secondary schools in this state and shall not include
instructional books and materials used in the teaching of religious tenets, doctrines or worship, the purpose of which is to inculcate such tenets, doctrines or
worship, nor shall it include such books or materials for, or transportation to,
extracurricular activities including sporting events, musical or dramatic events,
speech activities, driver's education, or programs of a similar nature.
Id. (footnote omitted); cf. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-30-12(c)(2) (1980).
The Rhode Island statute provided a deduction for:
amounts paid to others, not to exceed five hundred dollars ($500) for each dependent in kindergarten through sixth (6th) grade and seven hundred dollars
($700) for each dependent in grades seven (7) through twelve (12) inclusive, for
tuition, textbooks, and transportation of each such dependent attending an elementary or secondary school situated in Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Vermont, New Hampshire, or Maine, wherein a resident of this state may
legally fulfill the state's compulsory attendance laws, which is not operated for
profit, and which adheres to the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. As
used in this section, 'textbooks' shall mean and include books and other instructional materials and equipment used in elementary and secondary schools in
teaching only those subjects legally and commonly taught in public elementary
and secondary schools in this state and shall not include instructional books and
materials used in the teaching of religious tenets, doctrines, or worship, the purpose of which is to inculcate such tenets, doctrine or worship.
Id The Rhode Island statute was held unconstitutional in Rhode Island Fed'n of Teachers v. Norberg, 630 F.2d 855 (1st Cir. 1980).
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trary results on this issue.10 Last term, in Mueller v. Allen, I a sharply
divided Court12 held that a Minnesota state income tax deduction for
educational expenses 13 did not violate the establishment clause where
the deduction was available to all parents, including those whose children attended public schools and those whose children attended private
schools.14 The Court in Mueller expressly refused to consider, however,
statistical evidence which indicated that, notwithstanding its facial neutrality, the statute primarily benefited the parents of children in parochial schools.15 The Mueller decision marks a significant shift in
constitutional doctrine regarding aid to parochial schools and the establishment clause.
The purpose of this Comment is to examine, within the context of the
Mueller decision, the constitutionality of tax relief for parents of children
attending parochial schools. t 6 The author first reviews the Minnesota
statute and the three-part analysis which the Court purportedly has applied to statutes challenged on establishment clause grounds. The author then examines the Mueller decision, showing the minimal scrutiny
10. Compare Mueller v. Allen, 676 F.2d 1195 (8th Cir. 1982), affd, 103 S. Ct. 3062
(1983) (tax deduction statute upheld) wzih Rhode Island Fed'n of Teachers v. Norberg,
630 F.2d 855 (1st Cir. 1980) (statute nearly identical to Minnesota's struck down).
11. 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983).
12. The vote in Mueller was 5-4. Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion, in
which Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Powell, and O'Connor joined. 103 S. Ct.
at 3064. Justice Marshall filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Brennan, Blackmun,
and Stevens joined. Id. at 3071. Until Justice O'Connor replaced Justice Stewart, the
Court generally followed a 3-3-3 split in aid to parochial school cases. G. GUNTHER,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1568 (10th ed. 1980). At one extreme,
Justices White and Rehnquist, often joined by Chief Justice Burger, have taken the most
tolerant position regarding the permissible scope of aid to parochial schools. Id Justice
O'Connor's vote in Mueller seems to indicate that she has joined this group. At the other
extreme, Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall have generally taken a strict separationist position. Justice Stevens has replaced Justice Douglas in this group. These Justices
appear to believe the current three-part test permits too much aid to parochial schools.
Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Stewart have generally taken a position between the two
extremes; these Justices have often differed among themselves regarding the constitutionality of particular aid programs. Id.
13. MINN. STAT. § 290.09(22) (1982). For the full text of the Minnesota statute, see
supra note 9.
14. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3068 (1983).
15. See id at 3070.
16. The cases discussed in this Comment deal primarily with public aid to primary
and secondary rather than higher education. The Supreme Court has generally been
more tolerant of efforts to assist higher education. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S.
263 (1981) (establishment clause does not preclude use of state university facilities by
registered student religious organization); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736
(1976) (direct grants to church-related colleges to be used only for secular purposes upheld); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (grants to religious colleges through revenue
bonds for construction of buildings used for secular purposes upheld); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (grants to religious colleges for construction of buildings used for
religious purposes upheld).
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the Court applied to the Minnesota statute. The author argues that the
tax deduction upheld in Mueller is not sufficiently distinguishable from
the program of tax credits previously struck down by the Court; that the
Mueller Court's refusal to look beyond the facial neutrality of the statute
creates a troublesome precedent; and that the statute does not provide an
adequate guarantee that the state aid derived from public funds will be
used for exclusively secular purposes. In conclusion, the author suggests
that the Court might have better supported its policy of neutrality toward religion by resting its decision on the "passive effect" rationale previously utilized in upholding tax exemptions for religious institutions.
II.

THE CHALLENGED STATUTE

The Minnesota statute at issue in Mueller provides an income tax deduction for a variety of educational expenses incurred by parents of elementary and secondary school students.' 7 The statute provides that
deductions can be claimed for expenditures made in conjunction with all
schools which enable a Minnesota resident to fulfill state compulsory attendance laws.18 The statute allows deductions of up to $700 per year.' 9
Deductions can be claimed for tuition,20 textbooks, 2' and transportaMINN. STAT. § 290.09(22) (1982) (set out in full at supra note 9).
Id.
Id
Id. The district court in Mueller found that deductible tuition expenses included:
1. Tuition in the ordinary sense.
2. Tuition to public school students who attend public schools outside
their residence school districts.
3. Certain summer school tuition.
4. Tuition charged by a school for slow learner private tutoring services.
5. Tuition for instruction provided by an elementary or secondary school
to students who are physically unable to attend classes at such school.
6. Tuition charged by a private tutor or by a school that is not an elementary or secondary school if the instruction is acceptable for credit in an
elementary or secondary school.
7. Montessori School tuition for grades K through 12.
8. Tuition for driver education when it is part of the school curriculum.
514 F. Supp. at 1000. Both the Eighth Circuit and the Supreme Court accepted this
finding. See 676 F.2d at 1196; 103 S. Ct. at 3065 n.2.
21. MINN. STAT. § 290.02(22) (1982). The district court in Mueller found that the
statutory deduction for "textbooks" included not only "secular textbooks" but also:
1. Cost of tennis shoes and sweatsuits for physical education.
2. Camera rental fees paid to the school for photography classes.
3. Ice skate rental fee paid to the school.
4. Rental fee paid to the school for calculators for mathematics classes.
5. Costs of home economics materials needed to meet minimum
requirements.
6. Costs of special wood or metal needed to meet minimum requirements
of shop classes.
17.
18.
19.
20.
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tion22 expenditures. Expressly excluded are expenditures for books used
in courses not taught in public schools or whose purpose is to teach or
inculcate religious doctrines.2 3 The law is thus neutral on its face-its
benefits are available to all parents of school-age children, including
those whose children attend public schools.
The plaintiffs in Muller2 4 challenged the statute's constitutionality,
7. Costs of supplies needed to meet minimum requirements of art classes.
8. Rental fees paid to the school for musical instruments.
9. Cost of pencils and special notebooks required for class.
514 F. Supp. at 1000. The Eighth Circuit and the Supreme Court also accepted this
finding. See 676 F.2d at 1196 n.4; 103 S. Ct. at 3065 n.2.
22. MINN. STAT. § 290.09(22) (1982). State subsidization of bus transportation of
children to and from both public and private schools was upheld by the Supreme Court in
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
23. MINN. STAT. § 290.09(22) (1982).
24. The plaintiffs in Mueller were individual taxpayers acting individually and on
behalf of Minnesota taxpayers. The defendants were the Commissioner of Revenue of the
State of Minnesota and two groups of taxpayers who intervened in support of the challenged statute. 103 S. Ct. at 3075. The Mueller action was originally brought by five
plaintiffs. Since the validity of the statute had been upheld by a three-judge district court
panel in Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. Roemer, 452 F. Supp. 1316 (D. Minn. 1978),
defendants moved for dismissal on the grounds of res judicata and stare decisis. The district court dismissed three of the plaintiffs on the ground of res judicata because they had
an interest in Roemer. The district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the
remaining plaintiffs, holding that Roemer was not a representative taxpayers' suit. Mueller,
514 F. Supp. 998, 999 (D. Minn. 1981), aJf'd, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983). The district court
also held that it was not bound by the Roemer ruling, because the decision of the threejudge district court in Roemer, like any other district court decision, was not binding on
another district court. Id at 1001. The plaintiffs appealed, and in June 1982, the Eighth
Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the statute, finding it created "substantial benefits
flowing to all members of the public." Mueller, 676 F.2d 1198, 1205 (8th Cir. 1982). The
First Circuit, meanwhile, had struck down on establishment clause grounds a Rhode
Island statute virtually identical to the Minnesota law in Rhode Island Fed'n of Teachers
v. Norberg, 630 F.2d 855 (1st Cir. 1980).
None of the courts in Mueller, Norberg, or Roemer directly addressed the issue of
whether state taxpayers have standing in federal court to challenge the constitutionality
under the establishment and free exercise clauses of state expenditures of tax funds. In
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), the Supreme Court set forth a two-part standard to
determine whether a federal taxpayer had standing to challenge the constitutionality of a
federal expenditure of tax funds. First, because a taxpayer alleges injury only by virtue of
his liability for taxes, the Court held that "a taxpayer will be a proper party to allege the
unconstitutionality only of exercises of congressional power under the taxing and spending
clause of Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution." Id at 102. Second, the Court held that the
taxpayer must "show that the challenged enactment exceeds specific constitutional limitations upon the exercise of the taxing and spending power and not simply that the enactment is generally beyond the powers delegated to Congress by Art. I, § 8." Id at 102-03.
The taxpayer plaintiffs in Flast sought to enjoin the expenditure of federal funds under the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (repealed
1978), which they alleged were being used to support religious schools in violation of the
Establishment Clause. The Court held that the plaintiffs in Flast satisfied the two-part
test because "[tiheir constitutional challenge [was] made to an exercise by Congress of its
power under Art. I, § 8 to spend for the general welfare," 392 U.S. at 103, and because the
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despite its facial neutrality, because the most substantial monetary benefits afforded by the statute flow almost exclusively to the parents of children in private schools charging tuition.25 Tuition is the single largest
deductible expense allowed by the statute. 26 Since Minnesota public
schools are generally prohibited by law from charging tuition,27 the par-

ents of public school children are unable to claim the full tax benefit
allowed to parents of children in private schools.
III.

THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND AID TO PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS

The issue of state aid to parochial schools 28 has generated strong emoestablishment clause "operate as a specific constitutional limitation upon the exercise by
Congress of the taxing and spending power conferred by Art. I, § 8." Id at 104.
25. See Mueller, 103 S. Ct. at 3069-70.
26. See id.at 3074 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
27. See MINN. STAT. § 120.06 (1982). Minnesota public schools may assess tuition
charges only for students from outside the school district. Id. § 123.39, subd. 5. In the
1978-79 school year, only 79 Minnesota public school students fell into this category.
Mueller, 103 S. Ct. at 3072 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
28. The issue of state aid to nonpublic schools is almost entirely the issue of state aid
to Roman Catholic parochial schools. Approximately 90% of the children attending nonpublic schools in the United States attend Catholic schools. See L. PFEFFER, CHURCH
STATE AND FREEDOM 509 n.l (1967); F. SORAUF, supra note 4, at 14. In the late 1960's
approximately twelve to fifteen percent of the total American population of school age
children was enrolled in the Catholic school system. L. PFEFFER, supra, at 520.
Other groups favoring tuition tax relief include Jewish day schools, Episcopalian
schools, Missouri Synod Lutheran schools, and Evangelical Christian schools. See Morgan, The Establishment Clause and Sectarian Schools.- A FinalInstallment?, 1973 SuP. CT. REV.
57, 59; Note, The Constitutionah'ty of Tax Relieffor Parentsof Children Attending Publi and Nonpublic Schools, 67 MINN. L. REV. 793, 820 n. 182 (1983). The majority of American Jews
and Protestants, however, oppose direct government aid to religious schools. See L. PFEFFER, supra, at 526-29. There has been virtually no demand for state aid on the part of
nonpublic secular schools, which are generally private schools for the very wealthy. See id.
at 509. For the sake of convenience and clarity, this Comment uses the terms "parochial
schools" and "nonpublic schools" interchangeably to refer to all private schools.
The emergence of Catholic parochial schools in the United States coincided with the
first large influx of immigrants from Ireland and from southern and eastern Europe in the
second half of the 19th century. See R. MILLER & R. FLOWERS, TOWARD BENEVOLENT
NEUTRALITY: CHURCH, STATE, AND THE SUPREME COURT 422 (1982); Note, supra, at
820 n. 182. Some commentators have linked the emergence of Catholic parochial schools
in the 19th century in America to the perception by Catholics of public schools as Protestant-dominated and as exuding Protestant values through school prayers, the reading of
the King James version of the Bible, and the observance of only Protestant holidays. See
Note, supra, at 820 n. 182. Others have emphasized the belief among Catholics that secular
education cannot and should not be separated from religious education, and the rejection
of a public school system based on such a dichotomy. See R. MILLER & R. FLOWERS,
supra, at 422; L. PFEFFER, supra, at 342-46. Justice Jackson, in Everson v. Board of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1 (1947), stated that:
Our public school, if not a product of Protestantism, at least is more consistent with it than with the Catholic culture and scheme of values. It is a relatively recent development dating from about 1840. It is organized on the
premise that secular education can be isolated from all religious teaching so that
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tions. 29 Underlying the Court's constitutional deliberations in this area
are serious issues of educational policy. It is generally undisputed that

parochial schools provide quality education to a large percentage of
school children at little or no cost to the taxpayer.3 0 Parochial schools
also provide educational and cultural diversity, ends desirable in themselves.31 Those who support state aid to parochial schools have argued
the school can inculcate all needed temporal knowledge and also maintain a
strict and lofty neutrality as to religion.
Id at 23-24 (footnote omitted). Justice Douglas had a more idealistic view of the public
schools: "The public school was the true melting pot ....
The youngsters who came to
maturity through our public school system lost their racial identity and became plain
Americans, standing on their merits before their fellow men, and winning or losing according to their abilities." W. DouGLAs, WE THE JUDGEs 18-19 (1956).
29. The Catholic Church's efforts to create parochial schools intensified anti-Catholic
prejudices which were prevalent in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. See
R. MILLER & R. FLOWERS, supra note 28, at 423. During and just after World War I,
these prejudices, combined with nationalism, gave rise to a movement to abolish parochial
schools in America. Id The Supreme Court upheld the right of parochial schools to exist
in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). Pierce involved an Oregon law requiring all children, with limited exceptions, to attend only public schools. The law was enacted by popular petition and referendum, following a campaign organized by the Ku
Klux Klan and Scottish Rite Masons. See L. PFEFFER, supra note 28, at 515; Note, supra
note 28, at 797 n.21. The purpose of the act was to eliminate parochial and private
schools. L. PFEFFER, supra note 28, at 515. The Court struck down the statute on the
ground of substantive due process, recognizing the statute's interference with the economic
interests of the schools. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535-36. At the time the case was decided,
the Court had not yet incorporated the first amendment into the fourteenth amendment
as a restraint on state action. The first amendment was made applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108
(1943). See supra note 3.
30. See generally Committee of Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 814-16

(White, J., dissenting).
31. Id at 764; terce v. Society of Stzters, 268 U.S. at 535 ("The fundamental theory of
liberty upon which all governments in this union repose excludes any general power of the
state to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers
only."); Haskell, The Prospectsfor Public Aid to ParochialSchools, 56 MINN. L. REV. 159
(1971).
Perhaps the most compelling argument in opposition to state aid to parochial schools
is that such aid endangers the cultural and religious independence which these schools
have enjoyed in the past. If government aid is conditioned on a showing of the secular
nature of the school, a strong incentive is provided for the school to become more secular.
Note, Government Neutrality and Separation of Church and State.- Tuition Tax Credits, 92 HARV. L.
REV. 696, 703 (1979). The danger of government influence over the institutional decisions
of religious schools becomes serious if the schools are dependent on government assistance.
Id
The transformation of Fordham University in New York from a Jesuit university to
an essentially nonsectarian institution provides a dramatic example of how government
aid can encourage religious schools to compromise their religious mission. The state of
New York adopted an aid program providing aid to religiously affiliated colleges, if they
were found to be essentially nonsectarian. See N.Y. EDUc. LAW § 6401(2)(d) (McKinney
Supp. 1978-1979). Aid could be granted on the basis of responses to a questionnaire sent
out by the Commissioner of Education. The questionnaire sought information regarding
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that it is wholly acceptable for the state to contribute to the secular education of children attending these schools. These children, they argue,
have a right to a free education in the public schools, and the state, relieved of the burden of educating them, should contribute to the cost of
their education elsewhere.32 Those who oppose such aid have argued
that parochial schools are culturally divisive, isolating their students
33
from exposure to members of different ethnic and religious groups.
The foremost argument in opposition to state aid to parochial education
is that any such aid, no matter how indirect or slight, constitutes an establishment of religion in violation of the first amendment. 3 4 It was this
constitutional argument that the Court confronted in Mueller v. Allen. 35
The establishment and free exercise clauses of the first amendment
seek to protect religious belief and practice from the influence of the
state. The free exercise clause protects the individual's right, in matters
of religion, to "choose his own course . . .free of any compulsion from
the state." 36 The establishment clause is intended to preclude the
the "stated purposes of the school; the amount of financial assistance received from sponsoring churches; religious considerations in the selection of the governing board, faculty,
officers and students; the manner of teaching religion; the nature of any college connection
with a religious seminary; and the types of degrees awarded by the school." Note, supra,
at 704 n.47 (citations omitted). Fordham University was initially denied aid, and made
major changes to convince state officials that it was no longer a sectarian institution. Id.at
704. "Fordham lessened Jesuit control of the governing board and the presidency of the
university; the rectorship of the Jesuit Community was split from the university, and university facilities were made available to groups on a more denominationally neutral basis
.
Id...
at 704 n.51 (citations omitted). In 1970, Fordham received a $100,000 grant
from New York. Id at 705 n.52. Many other institutions made the necessary changes in
order to receive government funds; state officials expressed surprise at the number of
changes that took place in religious colleges during this period. See id at 704-05. Programs similar to the New York program were upheld in several states. See, e.g., Clayton v.
Kervick, 59 N.J. 583, 285 A.2d 11 (1971); Miller v. Ayers, 214 Va. 171, 198 S.E.2d 634
(1973); Weiss v. Bruno, 82 Wash. 2d 199, 509 P.2d 973 (1973). See generally Smith, Emerging Consequences of FinancingPrivate Colleges with Public Money, 9 VAL. U.L. REv. 561 (1975).
In Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971), the Supreme Court held that the federal government could constitutionally give construction aid to all private colleges, except
religiously affiliated schools where "religious indoctrination" is a "substantial purpose or
activity." Id at 687. The Tilton Court listed factors that distinguished colleges that could
constitutionally be subsidized from those that could not: the extent of religious discrimination in admission and faculty appointments, the existence of mandatory religious observances, the nature-academic or doctrinal-of the college's theology department, and
the school's policy on academic freedom. See id at 686-87. Lower courts have also developed standards to determine the degree of religious permeation of a college. See, e.g.,
Americans United for Separation of Church & State v. Bubb, 379 F. Supp. 872, 892-93
(D. Kan. 1974); Horace Mann League v. Board of Pub. Works, 242 Md. 645, 672, 220
A.2d 51, 65-66, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 97 (1966).
32. See, e.g., Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 814-15 (White, J., dissenting).
33. See L. PFEFFER, supra note 28, at 514, 524-25.
34. See id at 524.
35. 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983).
36. Abington School Dist. v. Schemmp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963). The argument that
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"sponsorship, financial support and active involvement of the sovereign
in religious activity." 37 Both clauses are drawn in absolute terms and
when either is carried to its logical extreme it conflicts with the other. 38
The Court has therefore attempted to steer a course between the two
clauses by adopting a policy of neutrality toward religion, stating that
the first amendment "requires the state to be a neutral in its relations
with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require
the state to be their adversary. State power is no more to be used so as to
39
handicap religions than it is to favor them."
In carrying out this policy of neutrality, the Court has conceded that
"[c]andor compels acknowledgment. . . that we can only dimly perceive
the lines of demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law." 40 Consequently, the Court has adopted a case-by-case approach, stating that the wall of separation between church and state is "a
blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship.' 4 1 Thus, although neutrality can be
infringed upon by minor encroachments,42 there remains room for the
kind of "play in the joints" 4 3 that will promote the general policy of
neutrality.
The Mueller Court applied a three-part analysis developed in past cases
for determining the constitutionality of statutes under the establishment
clause. 44 To withstand constitutional scrutiny, a challenged enactment
first must have a secular legislative purpose. 45 Second, it must have a
primary effect which neither advances nor inhibits religion.46 Third, the
end result must not be an excessive government entanglement with
7
religion.4
In cases involving aid to parochial schools, the Court has generally had
little trouble finding a valid secular purpose before addressing the regovernment funding of only secular public schools violates the free exercise clause was
rejected in Jackson v. California, 460 F.2d 282 (9th Cir. 1972), and in Brusca v. Missouri
ex rel.
State Bd. of Educ., 332 F. Supp. 272 (E.D. Mo. 1971), a'd,405 U.S. 1050 (1972).
See aso Note, supra note 31, at 700-01 n.34.
37. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
38. Id at 668-69.
39. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
40. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
41. Id at 614.
42. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222.
43. Wakz, 397 U.S. at 669.
44. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
45. Id The "secular purpose" and "primary effect" tests first appeared in Abington
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963), a case involving prayer in public
schools.
46. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612; see supra note 45.
47. 403 U.S. at 613. The "excessive entanglement" test was first set forth in Walz v.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970), a case involving state property tax exemptions for
religious institutions.
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maining tests. 48 The pattern reflects, in part, the Court's reluctance to

49
attribute unconstitutional motives to state legislatures.
The "primary effect" test has emerged as the most important prong of
the three-part test. The Court has relied on the "primary effect" test in
the majority of cases in which it has ruled aid programs unconstitutional.50 Until the Mueller decision, the Court had increasingly declined
to determine whether the effect of advancing religion in a particular case
was "primary" or "secondary."s Although the Court retained the "primary effect" label, the test actually applied was whether an effect of aiding religion was direct and immediate, or remote, indirect, and
incidental.5 2 This standard effectively compelled a more intensive scru53
tiny and was closer to an "any effect" test than a "primary effect" test.

48. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977) ("In the present case we
have no difficulty with the first prong of this three-part test. We are satisfied that the
challenged statute reflects Ohio's legitimate interest in protecting the health of its youth
and in providing a fertile educational environment for all the schoolchildren of the State."
(footnote omitted)); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 773 (1973) ("As the recitation of legislative purposes appended to New York's law
indicates, each measure is adequately supported by legitimate interests."); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971) ("[T]he statutes themselves clearly state that they are
intended to enhance the quality of secular education in all schools covered by the compulsory attendance laws. There is no reason to believe the legislatures meant anything else.");
see also Mueller v. Allen, 676 F.2d 1195, 1198 (8th Cir. 1982), afd, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983)
("The manifest purpose of the challenged statute is to provide all taxpayers a benefit
which will operate to enhance the quality of education in both public and private
schools."). The Supreme Court in Mueller also had little trouble with the "secular purpose" test. See infia notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
49. See Mueller, 103 S. Ct. at 3066.
50. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 248-55 (1977) (loans of instructional materials and equipment and provision of transportation and services for field trips violate test);
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 359-62 (1975) (loan of instructional materials and equipment violates test); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 830-33 (1973) (tuition reimbursement
plan violates test); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 794 (1973) (direct tuition grants, maintenance and repair grants, and tuition tax
credits violate test).
51. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783
n.39 (1973). In Nyquist, the Court stated that "we do not think that such metaphysical
judgments are either possible or necessary." Id at 783 n.39; see also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

§ 14-9 (1978).

52. See 413 U.S. at 783 n.39; L. TRIBE, supra note 51, § 14-9.
53. See Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783 n.39 (1973). The Nyquist Court stated, "Our cases
simply do not support the notion that a law found to have a 'primary' effect to promote
some legitimate end. . . is immune from further examination to ascertain whether it also
has the direct and immediate effect of advancing religion." Id at 783 n.39. InNyquist, the
Court struck down a New York program of aid to nonpublic schools. Justice White maintained in his dissent that "the test is one of 'primary' effect not any effect." Id at 823
(White, J., dissenting). The Minnesota Supreme Court echoed Justice White's argument
when it reluctantly followed Nquist and struck down Minnesota's tuition tax credit provision. Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. State, 302 Minn. 216, 232-33, 224 N.W.2d 344,
353 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 988 (1975). The Minnesota Supreme Court stated that
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The Court has set forth few definitive guidelines for applying the "primary effect" test. Nevertheless, it has considered several factors in determining whether challenged statutes violate this test. These factors
include the breadth of the class benefited by the statute;54 the degree to
which any benefit provided by the statute is "passive," or an affirmative
grant of aid; 55 and whether the benefits flow to individuals or directly to
religious institutions.56
The "excessive entanglement" test embodies the beliefs that "a union
of government and religion tends to destroy government and degrade
religion,"57 and that government and religion can best achieve their aims
and maintain their integrity when they do not "interfere excessively with
one another's respective spheres of choice and influence."58
The
"in applying the primary effects test, we must be guided by the realization ...
that this is
no longer a primary effects test, but an 'any effects' test." Id.
54. See Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3068-69 (1983); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392
U.S. 236, 242-43 (1968); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1947). In these
cases, the fact that the benefited class included parents of children in both public and
private schools was central to the Court's upholding the statutes. In Committeefor Pub. Educ.
& Reigious Liberty v. Nyquitt, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), on the other hand, the Court distinguished Allen and Everson on the ground that parents of public school children were excluded from the class of beneficiaries under the statute. Id at 782 n.38; see also Sloan v.
Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 832 (1973) (tuition reimbursement scheme held unconstitutional
where "[tihe State has singled out a class of its citizens for a special economic benefit"). In
Mueller, the Court distinguished Nyquist on this basis. See infra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 104-07 and accompanying text. Compare Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664 (1970) (passive property tax exemption for religious institutions held constitutional) with Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (affirmative tax benefits and "maintenance and
repair" grants held unconstitutional).
56. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 371 n.21 (1975) (general welfare services
may be provided to children regardless of any incidental benefit that may accrue to parochial school); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243-45 (loan of secular textbooks to
parochial school children directly benefits children and their parents, not schools); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (statute providing free bus transportation to
parochial school students aids parents in getting children safely to school, and does not aid
school itself). But see Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 781 (1973) ("the fact that aid is disbursed to parents rather than to the schools is only
one among many factors to be considered").
The Court in Mueller held that constitutional objections to the Minnesota tax deduction statute were reduced by the fact that the financial assistance was made available to
individual parents and not directly to the schools. See 103 S. Ct. at 3069; infra notes 86-87
and accompanying text.
57. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962).
58. L. TRIBE, supra note 51, § 14-12. Some Justices have criticized the "excessive entanglement" test as an unnecessary restatement of the "primary effect" test. In Roemer v.
Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 768 (1976), Justice White, joined by Justice Rehnquist, attacked the entanglement test as "superfluous," stating: "as long as there is a secular legislative purpose, and as long as the primary effect . . . is neither to advance nor
inhibit religion, I see no reason . . . to take the constitutional inquiry further." Id
(White, J., concurring); see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 665-66 (White, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Supreme Court has identified two forms of impermissible entanglement
of church and state: administrative and political.59 The concept of excessive administrative entanglement focuses on the problem of government intrusion into the religious sphere. 60 Regarding aid to parochial
schools, the Court has held that administrative entanglement can take
the form of continuing government surveillance of the expenditure of
public funds by the schools.61 In a 1971 case, the Court relied on this test

and ruled two aid programs unconstitutional, finding that such surveillance would inevitably be necessary to ensure that funds were not spent
62
for religious purposes.
The concept of excessive political entanglement reflects the Jeffersonian fears of religious interference with secular politics and of political
division along religious lines. 63 While the free exercise clause requires
that religious groups remain free to take ideological positions on public
issues, the Court has indicated that, under the establishment clause, the
role of organized religion must be more limited when it seeks to use the
political forum to obtain political and economic resources for its own
ends. 64 Thus, the Court has held that where a statute creates a serious
potential for repeated political confrontation between supporters and opponents of aid to parochial schools, it violates the establishment
clause. 65 Political division along religious lines, the Court has observed,
is "one of the principal evils against which the Establishment Clause was
66
intended to protect."
59. See L. TRIBE, supra note 51, § 14-12.
60. See id.
61. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971).
62. See id.In Lemon, the Court struck down a Rhode Island statute which provided a
fifteen percent supplement to the salaries of teachers of secular subjects in nonpublic
schools, and a Pennsylvania statute which authorized the "purchase" by the state of "secular educational services" from nonpublic schools.
The Court held that enforcement of the Rhode Island statute, which required that
the teachers being reimbursed teach only secular subjects, would involve an impermissible
entanglement between Church and State: "A comprehensive, discriminating and continuing state surveillance will inevitably be required to ensure that these restrictions are
obeyed . . . . Unlike a book, a teacher cannot be inspected once so as to determine the
extent and intent of his or her personal belief.
...
.d at 619. The Court also found
excessive entanglement in the requirement that the government examine the schools'
records to determine how much of the total expenditures are spent on secular education
and how much on religious activity. Id. at 620. The Court held that the Pennsylvania
statute fostered excessive entanglement for the same reasons. Id at 620-21.
63. See L. TRIBE, supra note 51, § 14-12.
64. See id
65. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975); iyquist, 413 U.S. at 794;
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971).
66. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975).
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THE MUELLER DECISION

The Supreme Court in Mueller, as in past cases, 6 7 had no difficulty
with the "secular purpose" aspect of the three-part establishment clause
test. 68 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, stated that the Minnesota statute "plainly serves [the] secular purpose of ensuring that the
state's citizenry is well-educated." 69 The majority held that Minnesota
could validly conclude "that there is a strong public interest in assuring
the continued financial health of private schools," because private
schools educate a substantial number of students at no cost to the taxpayer and in addition "may serve as a benchmark [of quality] for public
schools."70

The Mueller decision reaffirms the precedence of the "primary effect"
test over the other two prongs of the three-part test, but simultaneously
allows minimal scrutiny of challenged statutes under the test where the
statutes are facially neutral. The plaintiffs in Mueller relied mainly on
the "primary effect" test in challenging the Minnesota tax deduction. 7'
They argued that, although the statute on its face provided a deduction
for expenses related to both public and nonpublic education, the overwhelming effect of the law was to aid taxpayers with dependents in sectarian schools. 72 In support of this contention, the plaintiffs offered
statistical evidence indicating that only four percent of the students attending Minnesota private schools in 1978-79 attended non-sectarian
schools. 73 Therefore, they argued, the primary effect of the statute was
67. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
68. 103 S. Ct. at 3066-67. The district court and the Eighth Circuit also dealt rather
summarily with the plaintiffs' argument in Mueller that the challenged statute did not
satisfy the "secular purpose" test. The defendants argued that the statute had the secular
purpose of assisting Minnesota taxpayers in "providing dependents with a safe, effective
and valid educational environment." Mueller, 514 F. Supp. at 1001. The district court
relied on Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971), holding such a legislative purpose
presumptively valid, and found that the plaintiffs had not indicated any circumstances to
rebut the presumption. 514 F. Supp. at 1007. The Eighth Circuit concurred. 676 F.2d at
1198.
69. 103 S. Ct. at 3067.
70. Id
71. Brief for Respondent Clyde E. Allen, Jr., Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue at
10-11, Mueller, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983).
72. 103 S. Ct. at 3069-70.
73. Id at 3070. The defendants in Mueller argued that the plaintiffs' statistical argument contained serious omissions and faulty assumptions. According to the defendants,
the plaintiffs incorrectly assumed that only full-time tuition payments were deductible,
and failed to account for deductions available for such items as summer school tuition,
driver's education tuition, textbooks, and transportation expenses at public and non-sectarian private schools. Brief for Respondent at 16.
The district court agreed with the defendants, finding that the plaintiffs' statistical
analysis "lack[ed] credibility by reason of omissions of serious significance." 514 F. Supp.
at 1003. The Eighth Circuit also rejected the plaintiffs' statistical argument, finding that
the statute created "substantial benefits flowing to all members of the public." 676 F.2d at
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74
the support and advancement of religion.
The Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs' argument, holding that "a
program, like [the Minnesota statute] that neutrally provides state assistance to a broad spectrum of citizens is not readily subject to challenge
under the Establishment Clause." 75 The majority held that the statute's
facial neutrality was sufficient to meet the requirements of the establishment clause, and that the plaintiffs' statistical analysis was constitutionally irrelevant. In the Court's words: "We would be loath to adopt a
rule grounding the constitutionality of a facially neutral law on annual
reports reciting the extent to which various classes of private citizens

claimed benefits under the law."76 Thus, the Court distinguished Com-

mittee for Public Education
onyqulst,
and Religious Liberty v.
77 the 1973 case in
which the Court invalidated a New York statute providing tuition grants
and tax credits only for the parents of parochial school children.78 The
1205. Because the Supreme Court held the statistical evidence constitutionally irrelevant,
it did not reach the questions of its credibility. 103 S. Ct. at 3070.
Justice Marshall pointed out in his dissent, however, that in the 1978-79 school year,
90,000 students were enrolled in nonpublic schools charging tuition, and that over 95% of
those students attended sectarian schools. Id at 3072 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
74. 103 S. Ct. at 3069-70.
75. Id. at 3069.
76. Id at 3070. In Rhode Island Fed'n of Teachers v. Norberg, 630 F.2d 855 (1st Cir.
1980), a similar statistical argument was central to the court's holding that a Rhode Island
state tax deduction, almost identical to the Minnesota statute upheld in Mueller, was unconstitutional. Id at 859-60; see supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text. The district
court in Norberg found that the fact that the deduction was available to parents of children
in both public and private schools was "mere window dressing" where the overwhelming
majority of taxpayers eligible for the deduction sent their children to parochial schools.
479 F. Supp. 1364, 1371 (D.R.I. 1979).
77. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
78. Id. The statute struck down in Nyquist provided three financial aid programs for
nonpublic elementary and secondary schools. The first program provided direct money
grants to "qualifying" nonpublic schools to be sued for "maintenance and repair" of facilities and equipment to ensure the students' "health, welfare and safety." A "qualifying"
school was a nonpublic, non-profit elementary or secondary school serving a high concentration of students from low-income families. Id at 762-63. The second program established a tuition reimbursement plan for parents of children attending nonpublic
elementary or secondary schools. To qualify, a parent's annual taxable income had to be
less than $5,000. Id at 764. The third program was designed to give tax relief to parents
failing to qualify for tuition reimbursement. Each eligible parent was entitled to deduct a
stipulated sum from his adjusted gross income for each child attending a nonpublic school.
The amount of deduction was unrelated to the amount of tuition actually paid and decreased as the amount of taxable income increased. Id at 765-66.
The Court held in Nyquzst that each of the programs had a valid secular purpose. Id
at 773. The Court found all of the programs invalid, however, because they had the
primary effect of advancing the religious activities of the parochial schools. The Court
held that the maintenance and repair program inevitably had the effect of subsidizing
religious activity, because no attempt was made to restrict payments to those expenditures
related to the upkeep of facilities used exclusively for secular purposes. Id at 774. The
tuition reimbursement plan also failed the "primary effect" test because, as the Court
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Court in Nyquist found crucial the fact that the tax benefits authorized
by the New York law were made available only to the parents of children
79
in nonpublic schools.
The majority in Mueller distinguished the Minnesota statute from the
statute struck down in Nyquzsl in another respect: the Minnesota statute
was a "genuine tax deduction," whereas the New York statute, while
stated, "in the absence of an effective means of guaranteeing that the state aid derived
from public funds will be used exclusively for secular, neutral and nonideological purposes, it is clear from our cases that direct aid in whatever form is invalid." Id at 780.
The Court found no significant difference between the third program, which provided tax
credits to middle-income parents, and the tuition reimbursement program. Id. at 790-91.
The Court held the tax credit invalid, stating that "neither form of aid is sufficiently
restricted to assure that it will not have the impermissible effect of advancing the sectarian
activities of religious schools." Id at 794. Because the Court held that the challenged
statute had the primary effect of advancing religion, it did not reach the "excessive entanglement" test. Id The Court noted in dictum, however, that government aid of this type
carries grave potential for creating political divisions along religious lines. Id.
On the same day that the Court decided Nyquist, it decided Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S.
825 (1973). Sloan involved a Pennsylvania tuition reimbursement law enacted after the
previous Pennsylvania aid to nonpublic schools program was struck down in Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The tuition reimbursement program in Sloan was similar
to the New York program struck down in Nyquist except that reimbursements were authorized for all parents regardless of their income level. The State argued in Sloan that the
tuition reimbursement program clearly would not be unconstitutional if it applied only to
parents of children in nonsectarian private schools and that by extending it to the parents
of children in sectarian schools, Pennsylvania was affording all private school parents the
equal protection of the laws. 413 U.S. at 834. The Supreme Court rejected this argument,
holding that there was no "copstitutionally significant difference" between the primary
effect of the Pennsylvania program and the New York program struck down in Nyqu'st.
Id at 828.
The Minnesota Supreme Court followed the Nyquit~ decision when it reluctantly
struck down Minnesota's tax credit provision in Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. State,
302 Minn. 216, 224 N.W.2d 344 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 988 (1975). The challenged
provision provided that tax credits could be claimed by the parents of children in private
kindergarten, elementary, and secondary schools. MINN. STAT. § 290.086(3) repealed by
Act of March 31, 1980, ch. 419, § 46,1980 Minn. Laws 159, 196. The maximum available
credits were $50.00 per year for a kindergarten student, $100.00 for an elementary school
student, and $140.00 for a secondary school student. Id The Minnesota Supreme Court
stated, "In applying the 'primary effects test,' we must be guided by the realization . . .
that this is no longer a primary effects test, but an 'any effects' test." 302 Minn. at 232,
224 N.W.2d at 353. The court further stated that: "The majority opinion in Nyqurt~ disregarding the balancing of Walz and related cases has chartered a new course, giving clear
preference to the Establishment Clause . . . of the First Amendment." Id. at 233, 224
N.W.2d at 353. Justice Yetka, concurring specially, stated that:
The strict scrutiny that legislation, such as that struck down today, must undergo appears far beyond the degree of protection necessary to insure that our
nation will be free from a 'state religion' or religious persecution of its citizens.
Rather, our legislature appears now to be barred from making any reasonable
effort to insure that nonpublic education will survive except for the very wealthy.
However, the highest court in our land has spoken, and this court and our legislature must adhere to its word.
Id. at 236, 224 N.W.2d at 354-55.
79. 413 U.S. at 782 n.38; see Mueller, 103 S. Ct. at 3067.
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nominally a deduction, was in effect a tax credit. 80 Under the New York
law, the amount of the deduction was unrelated to the amount of tuition
actually paid, but decreased as the amount of taxable income inLow-income parents were eligible for outright tuition
creased.81
grants.8 2 The Ayquist Court noted that the benefits afforded by the New
York law did not take the form of ordinary tax benefits and expressed
doubt that they could be regarded as part of a genuine system of tax
laws. 8 3 Under the Minnesota law, on the other hand, the amount of the
benefit was directly related to the amount of the expenditure. 84 The majority in Mueller found this fact to be "of some relevance . . . considering
the traditional rule of deference accorded legislative classifications in tax
statutes."85
The Court considered two other factors in holding that the Minnesota
statute met the "primary effect" test. First, the Court held that establishment clause objections were reduced because the financial assistance,
in the form of tax deductions, was made available to the parents and not
directly to the schools. 86 Thus, the Court reasoned, aid to parochial
schools was available "only as a result of numerous, private choices of
individual parents," and "no 'imprimatur of State approval' [could] be
deemed to have been conferred on any particular religion, or on religion
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

103 S. Ct. at 3067 n.6; Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 766-67.
413 U.S. at 765-67.
Id at 764-65.
Id at 792.
See 103 S.Ct. at 3065 (construing MINN. STAT. § 290.09(22) (1982)).
Id. at 3068 n.6. In Nqut~t, the Court made clear that its decision did not turn on

this distinction between tax credits and tax deductions, stating that "the constitutionality

of this hybrid benefit does not turnAn any event on the label we accord it." 413 U.S. at
789.
The Eighth Circuit in Mueller distinguished the statute struck down in NyquL~/ from

the Minnesota statute on this basis. 676 F.2d at 1203. The First Circuit in Norberg, on the
other hand, found the distinction unimportant, concluding that under the Rhode Island
deduction, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-30-12(c)(2) (1980), a tax benefit would result for any

parent who owed federal income tax and paid tuition at a qualifying private school. Norberg, 630 F.2d at 859. Rhode Island taxpayers' state income tax liability is directly related
to a percentage of federal income tax. The amount of tax benefit from the challenged

deduction depended on the amount of the deduction and the federal income tax bracket.
The Norberg court concluded that eligible taxpayers in Rhode Island would receive an
annual tax benefit of $33 from the deduction. Id.Thus, the First Circuit concluded, the
deduction "would confer a tax benefit along nearly solid sectarian lines." Id at 860.
Under the Minnesota statute, on the other hand, the state income tax is not related to the
federal income tax and whether a parent obtains a tax benefit depends on whether the

deduction is sufficient to move the taxpayer from a higher tax bracket to a lower one.
Mueller, 676 F.2d at 1204; MINN. STAT. § 290.02(22) (1982). The Eighth Circuit concluded: "Unlike the statute in Nyquitt, there is within the Minnesota statute 'no legislative
attempt to assure that each family would receive a carefully estimated net benefit.' " 676

F.2d at 1204.
86. 103 S.Ct. at 3069.
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generally."8 7 Second, the Court found the benefit to parochial schools
insubstantial and attenuated in light of the evils against which the establishment clause was designed to protect. 88
Mueller reaffirms the secondary role now played by the "excessive entanglement" test in establishment clause cases. 89 The Court stated that
the only plausible source of entanglement lay in the requirement that
state officials determine whether particular textbooks qualify for a deduction.90 The statute expressly disallows deductions for the cost of
books and instructional materials whose purpose is "to inculcate [religious] tenets, doctrines or worship." 9 1 The majority held that this provision of the challenged statute was controlled by the Court's prior decision
in Board of Education v. Allen. 92 In Allen, the Court upheld the loan of
93
secular textbooks to parents of children attending nonpublic schools.
The requirement that state officials determine whether particular books
were secular, however, was not considered by the Court in Allen. 94
87. Id. (citation omitted).
88. Id
89. See supra note 58.
90. The Court noted that no party to the Mueller litigation had argued that the Minnesota statute ran afoul of the "political entanglement" test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 622. Mueller, 103 S. Ct. at 3071 n. 1l;
see supra notes 62-65 and
accompanying text. The Court in Mueller held that the "political divisiveness" language
of Lemon "must be regarded as confined to cases where direct financial subsidies are paid
to parochial schools or to teachers in parochial schools." 103 S.Ct. at 3071 n.l 1.
91. MINN. STAT. § 290.09(22) (1982); see supra note 9.

92. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
93. Id.
94. Id The "excessive entanglement" test had not yet emerged at the time Allen was
decided. The test first appeared in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970).
The dissenters in Mueller argued that the deduction for textbooks and other instructional materials violated the establishment clause. 103 S. Ct. at 3076-77 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Although the Court had upheld the loan of secular textbooks to parochial
schools in Allen, 392 U.S. at 236, the dissenters in Mueller argued that even the use of
wholly secular, non-ideological books and materials contributes to the religious mission of
parochial schools, because the process of secular education is so permeated with religion at
these schools. Id at 3077. Justice Douglas relied on this "permeation" argument in his
dissent in Allen. See 392 U.S. at 254-66 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas stated:
[T]he statutory system provides that the parochial school will ask for the books it
wants. Can there be the slightest doubt that the head of the parochial school
will select the book or books that best promote its sectarian creed?
* . * The textbook goes to the very heart of education in a parochial school.
It is the chief, although not solitary, instrumentality for propagating a particular
religious creed or faith.
Id at 256-57 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
The argument is not universally accepted. According to one author, "Catholic educators. . . as a whole, do not favor textbooks in which dabs of spurious religion serve only
to distort the essential subject matter .
C..."
Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to
ParochialSchools, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 260, 291-95 (1968) (quoting Ball, FederalAid--1964, 61
NAT'L CATHOLIc EDUc. Ass'N BULL. 228, 229 (1968)); see also Board of Educ. v. Allen,
392 U.S. 236, 245 (1968) ("[Tlhis Court has long recognized that religious schools pursue
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V.

ANALYSIS

The majority opinion in Mueller is troublesome for several reasons.
First, the Minnesota tax deduction is not sufficiently distinguishable
from the program struck down in Nyquist to justify the Mueller holding.
The distinction between the New York tax credit program and the Minnesota tax deduction was, as Justice Marshall stated in his dissent, "a
distinction without a difference"; 95 in both cases taxpayers in general
were required to pay for the cost of parochial education, and the state
provided a financial incentive for parents to send their children to parochial schools. 96 The only real difference between the two programs was
that the New York program provided aid only to the parents of children
in private schools,9 7 whereas the Minnesota statute allowed the parents
of children in both public and nonpublic schools to deduct the expenses
of their childrens' education.98 As the dissenters pointed out, however,
the most substantial benefit provided by the statute-the tuition deduction-is simply not available to parents who send their children to public
schools. 99 It is unlikely, as Justice Marshall stated, "that [these parents]
will buy $700 worth of pencils, notebooks, and bus rides for their schoolage children."1 °°
The majority's refusal to look beyond the facial neutrality of the statute is the most questionable aspect of the Mueller decision. Justice Marshall pointed out that in previous aid to parochial schools cases the Court
based its decisions on the actual effect of the challenged statute. 10 1 The
two goals, religious instruction and secular education. . . .The State's interest in education would be served sufficiently by reliance on the secular teaching that accompanied
religious training in [religious] schools"). But see Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 47
(1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting); Note, supra note 31, at 700 n.2 9 ; Note, Aid to Parochial
Schools. Income Tax Credits, 56 MINN. L. REv. 189, 201 (1971); Pope Leo XIII, Afilitanti
Ecclesiar (1897); Pope Pius XI, Rappresentantiin Terra (1929) (both arguing that every subject taught in Catholic schools be "permeated with Christian piety").
95. 103 S. Ct. at 3075.
96. See id at 3076 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
97. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
98. MINN. STAT. § 290.09(22) (1982); see supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
99. 103 S. Ct. at 3076 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 3074.
101. Id. Justice Marshall pointed out that in Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 756, and in Sloan v.
Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973), the Court had in fact made the kind of factual inquiry that
the majority in Mueller refused to enter into. 103 S.Ct. at 3074 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
In Nyquist, the Court emphasized that "virtually all" of the schools receiving direct
grants were Roman Catholic schools, 413 U.S. at 774; that reimbursements were given to
parents "who send their children to nonpublic schools, the bulk of which is concededly
sectarian in orientation," id. at 780, that it is "precisely the function of New York's law to
provide assistance to private schools, the great majority of which are sectarian," id at 783;
and that "tax reductions authorized by this law flow primarily to the parents of children
attending sectarian, nonpublic schools." Id. at 794.
In Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. at 830, the Court considered the fact that "more than
90% of the children attending nonpublic schools in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
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Mueller holding apparently enables states to channel as much aid as they
wish to the parents of children in parochial schools with one qualification: the aid must be available at least nominally to the parents of public school children. This would be true regardless of how great the
deductible expenses of parents of parochial school children, or how nominal the expenses of parents of public school children were. 102 The Court
effectively has declared that it will no longer consider the "primary effect" of an aid program if some minimal benefit is available to the parents of children attending public schools.
Finally, the Minnesota statute does not provide an adequate guarantee
that the state aid derived from public funds will be used for exclusively
secular purposes and not to further the religious missions of parochial
schools. Past Supreme Court cases strongly indicate that, in the absense
of such a guarantee or restriction, state aid is invalid.1o 3 In this respect,
the Mueller decision represents a significant departure from precedent.
The majority in Mueller chose not to overrule NAquist, but instead
rested its decision on a rather narrow distinction of that case. The result
is two sharply inconsistent decisions regarding the constitutionality of tax
relief for the parents of children attending parochial schools.
The Mueller majority could have rested its decision on sounder constitutional principle by relying on the "passive effect" rationale utilized by
the Court in Walz v. Tax Commz'ssi'on. 104 In Walz, a New York property
tax exemption for religious institutions was held constitutional. 10 5 The
Court in Walz observed that, although tax exemptions give an indirect
economic benefit to churches, they give rise to a lesser government entanglement with religion than would taxation, with its attendant problems
of valuation of church property, liens, foreclosures, and other confrontaare enrolled in schools that are controlled by religious institutions or that have the purpose
of propagating and promoting religious faith." Id.
Similarly, in Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 363 (1975), the Court held that "the
direct loan of instructional material and equipment has the unconstitutional primary effect of advancing religion because of the predominantly religious character of the schools
benefiting from the Act." Id. The Court in Meek relied on a finding that "of the 1,320

nonpublic schools in Pennsylvania that . . .qualify for aid . . .more than 75% are
church-related or religiously affiliated institutions." Id.at 364.
In Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 233 (1977), the Court relied on a stipulation that
"during the 1974-1975 school year there were 720 chartered nonpublic schools in Ohio.
Of these, all but 29 were sectarian. More than 96% of the nonpublic enrollment attended
sectarian schools, and more than 92% attended Catholic schools." Id.
102. The Minnesota tax deduction may not exceed $500 per dependent in grades kindergarten through six or $700 per dependent in grades seven through twelve. MINN.
STAT. § 290.09(22) (1982). The Mueller decision, however, does nothing to prevent states

from allowing even greater deductions.
103. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 250-51 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421
U.S. 349, 366 (1975); Nyquisl, 413 U.S. at 774-80; Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
104. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
105. Id
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tions and conflicts1 o 6 In Nyquist, on the other hand, an affirmative tax

benefit scheme was held unconstitutional. 107
The majority in Mueller could have held that the Minnesota deduction
is more analogous to the passive abstention from taxation upheld in Walz
than to the affirmative grant of aid struck down in Nyquzst. 108 In Nyquzist,

the Court found that the tax benefit was unrelated to the amount of
tuition actually paid.10 9 In contrast, the Minnesota statute challenged in
Mueller provides deductions based only on actual expenditures and involves no affirmative payment or grant. 1 10
VI.

CONCLUSION

There can be little doubt that parochial schools in America have made
significant contributions to the communities in which they operate and
to the nation as a whole. As Justice Powell stated in a previous opinion,
"Parochial schools, quite apart from their sectarian purpose, have provided an educational alternative for millions of young Americans; they
often afford wholesome competition with our public schools; and in some
states they relieve substantially the tax burden incident to the operation
of public schools."11l
Notwithstanding these contributions, however, our nation was established on the premise that government support of religion, however
slight, indirect or attenuated, is detrimental to both government and religion. This is the principle embodied in the establishment clause of the
first amendment. Minnesota has provided a tax benefit to parents for
106. Id at 674.

107. 413 U.S. 756.
108. The Eighth Circuit in Mueller relied in part on this argument, holding that the
Minnesota deduction was analogous to section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code, which
provides a federal income tax deduction for contributions to religious and charitable institutions. See 676 F.2d at 1205; I.R.C. § 170 (1983). The constitutionality of section 170 has
never been considered by the Supreme Court. Its validity, however, was strongly suggested by the Court in Walz, 397 U.S. at 676 n.4 (discussion of I.R.C. § 501, which exempts religious and charitable institutions from payment of federal income tax). One
commentator has made a compelling argument for the validity of section 170. His argument is equally applicable to Minnesota Statutes section 290.09(22):
The deduction is not structured to encourage contributions to religion, as would
a tax credit that reduced the taxpayer's bill by the amount of his contribution.
Taxpayers are left with less money in their pockets after making a religious donation and paying the reduced tax bill than if they made no contribution and
payed only the higher taxes.
• . .The deduction can therefore be properly rationalized as part of a fiscal
policy that seeks to do no more than neutralize the dampening effect of taxes on
voluntary religious giving, a policy well within the doctrine of political
neutrality.
Giannella, Re/iious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and DoctrinalDevelopment. PartII The Nonestablishment Prhciple, 81 HARv. L. REv. 513, 549 (1968).
109. 413 U.S. at 761-67.
110. MINN. STAT. § 290.09(22) (1982); see infra note 84 and accompanying text.
111. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 262 (1977).
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the expenses of parochial school education without sufficient restrictions
to ensure that the public funds thus channeled to the schools will be used
for exclusively secular purposes. By upholding this program, the
Supreme Court has departed from its policy of neutrality toward religion
and created a breach in the "wall of separation" between Church and
State guaranteed by the first amendment.
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